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will form in early 1998. At this time, the European Council will name those countries that are eligible to form
an EMU (due to their compliance with the five economic criteria). This decision of allowing the “in” countries
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and central bank authority. Several benefits and costs are associated with the formation of an EMU. The size of
the EMU will also influence these costs and benefits of an EMU-6 of Germany, France, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy, for example, versus an EMU of all 15 member nations. By using the theory of
optimal currency areas, one can examine the costs and benefits of an EMU, especially in relation to Eastern
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Sean Hantak
The countdown to form a united Europe
continues.  The first phase of the Economic and
Monetary Union will form in early 1998.  At this time,
the European Council will name those countries that
are eligible to form an EMU (due to their compliance
with the five economic criteria).  This decision of
allowing the in countries to proceed in an EMU will
affect the future decisions of the EMU.  Three
conditions are crucial to insure the existence of an
Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: a single
currency, the euro; a single exchange rate; and central
bank authority.  Several benefits and costs are
associated with the formation of an EMU.  The size of
the EMU will also influence these costs and benefits
of an EMU-6 of Germany, France, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy, for example, versus
an EMU of all 15 member nations. By using the theory
of optimal currency areas, one can examine the costs
and benefits of an EMU, especially in relation to
Eastern European enlargement.  Separate European
cultural identities that have developed over the last
millenium and individual economic situations in these
nations will provide the biggest challenges of the
formation of a single European Monetary Union in
the next century.
In approaching the theory of an optimal
currency area, a good place to begin is with a
definition.  According to Copeland, a Single Currency
Zone is one where the accepted means of payment
consists either of a single, homogeneous currency, or
of two or more currencies linked by an exchange rate
which is fixed (at one-for-one) irrevocably.1  He also
refers to this Single Currency Zone as a Monetary
Union, referring to the European Union project.  The
EU is currently at the second stage of 15 different
currencies aiming to link with one fixed exchange rate.
During the third stage of the EMU, the European
System of Central Banks will administer the common
currency, the euro.  Thus, a Monetary Union, like that
of the EU or the USA does not necessarily imply an
optimal currency area.  As a unit of account, the euro,
or the dollar, economically unites the areas where each
is circulated, but does not make these optimal currency
areas.  To illustrate, more than seventeen small
countries have pegged their exchange rate to the US
dollar, but this does not necessarily imply that Hong
Kong and the USA are optimal currency areas.2 There
must be certain characteristics then that foster an
optimal currency area such as high internal trade, high
mobility of labor, a correlation of economic shocks
and a federal fiscal system to transfer funds to the
regions that suffer adverse shocks.3  One helpful
characteristic that allows the US to be in a more likely
position to form an optimal currency area is a common
language and a relatively homogenous culture.  When
these characteristics are present, the benefits of a
Monetary Union are feasible for the regions or
countries involved in the union.
Several benefits will exist for the EU nations
now forming an Economic and Monetary Union.  With
a fixed exchange rate mechanism, and an eventual
single currency, several costs will be reduced.  With a
high level of internal trade, transaction costs of goods
and services from one nation to another will be reduced
due to the elimination of an exchange rate.  The bid-
ask spread (or the price difference in buying and selling
a currency) involved in exchange transactions will
disappear, facilitating freer trade, higher efficiency and
a reduction in information costs.  With one euro
circulating in Europe, prices will become more
transparent.  For example, citizens in Spain and
Germany will have the same notion of the worth of a
good or service.  A freely floating exchange rate
mechanism allows for the constant fluctuation of such
prices, resulting in menu costs  (such as the reprinting
of information like prices) as well as the need to
constantly monitor the exchange rates.  In addition,
travelers will avoid confusion and collecting pockets
full of  expensive souvenirs as they move from
country to country.
A single currency in a monetary union
decreases the uncertainty of trade involving several
currencies.  There will be no need to buy futures
contracts in order to hedge against exchange rate risks.
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In terms of exchange rate fluctuations, prices of Italian
goods, for example, will remain constant and
understandable for a Dutch importer wanting to buy
the Italian goods.  A single currency will free up those
dedicated to constantly monitoring the changes and
uncertainty of exchange rates to other, more productive
tasks within the EU.  Less economic uncertainty will
increase the volume of trade, providing comparative
advantages for the countries involved and ultimately
raising the standards of living for all participating
nations.
Additional benefits will be derived from a
single currency and an EMU.  Whether or not the euro
unites the participating countries with a shared sense
of economic identity, the euro will be demanded as a
world currency.  The use of the
euro will allow nations to have
more of an economic influence in
the world markets compared to
the use of just their national
currencies.  To clarify, the euro
will be a much stronger currency
than the peseta or escudo could
ever be alone.
  The Economic and
Monetary Union also has the
chance to reduce inefficient
economic behavior as
organizational changes shift some
power from each country to the
central authority.  Stagnant high
unemployment in nations like Spain and Italy may
change with increased economic development.  Many
college students in Spain are in no rush to complete
their studies, often time dragging them out for 8 years.
The job market is so bleak, even for graduates that
are practically specialists in their fields, that there is
little opportunity to immediately enter the labor
market.  The high Spanish unemployment level is
affecting society in that competition is extremely high
for relatively few available positions.  Powerful trade
unions, like those in France, will have to possibly
restructure or combine with other European trade
unions in order to maintain their influence not just in
France, but in all of Europe.  Regardless, these
possibilities offer the chance to change conditions like
labor rigidity and the lack of job opportunities for
college graduates.
The absence of essential characteristics (labor
mobility, a federal fiscal system that accommodates
its member nations and a shared sense of economic
identity, etc.) that form an Economic and Monetary
Union translates to higher costs for forming such an
EMU.  Small internal adjustment mechanisms like low
labor mobility, a federal fiscal system that reduces
economic shocks in certain areas and cultural
differences only provide additional barriers toward
forming an EMU.  The completion of the five
convergence criteria will permit the nations of the
EMU to be more economically united to face these
challenges.  Briefly, the convergence criteria involve
target inflation, exchange and long term interest rates
as well as specified levels of budget deficit and
government debt of each nation.
With more than 15 languages
spoken in the EU and large
economic and cultural
differences existing between
Denmark and Greece, for
example, labor mobility remains
quite limited.   Danes may
vacation in Greece due to the
pleasant climate and rich culture
yet may not chose to live there.
Likewise, from a Greek
perspective, although the Danish
standard of living is much higher
in economic terms than that in
Greece, a mass exodus of
workers from Greece to Denmark may not necessarily
occur.  An extremely large economic difference in the
wage level and opportunities for employment must
exist in order to initiate the movement of labor across
borders.  Due to the large economic differences in
Germany and Turkey, there is a large presence of
Turkish Gästarbeiter (guest workers) in Germany.
Labor mobility is an internal adjustment mechanism
that transfers human capital from an area in an
economic downturn to one where rapid growth leads
to a high demand for labor.  Although many Europeans
are at least bilingual if not polyglots, many speak only
dialects and their national language and may have little
experience with other European cultures.  With
southern Italians now unlikely to move to northern
Italy to find work due to regional and national
differences, such individuals are not very likely to cross
Whether or not the
euro unites the par-
ticipating countries
with a shared sense of
economic identity, the
euro will be de-
manded as a world
currency.
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international borders in order to find employment.
Europeans are prouder than ever of not only their
national, but regional identities, which only decreases
the likelihood of high labor mobility and a sense of
common identity within the European Union.
With the use of a single currency and a one
size fits all monetary policy4, one major drawback to
the EMU is the loss of control over Monetary Policy.
Central banks of member nations must give up
domestic control of conducting open market
operations, setting reserve requirements, making
discount loans, enforcing capital controls and
intervening in foreign exchange markets.5  When
multiple, unrelated problems arise in the EU, the
challenge will be to accommodate the needs of each
situation without sacrificing or prioritizing one
problem for another.  The EU will not want to anger
an entire region or industry while ameliorating the
economic problems in another area.  This issue is
extremely pertinent in that the economic effects of one
area are bound to affect other areas of the EU in some
way.
The size of the EMU is an important concept
in the success of its functioning.  Robert Mundell holds
that a small economically based union is in the best
interests of the EU.  For the previously stated reasons,
he argues that a smaller, tighter economic base
throughout a common currency area is necessary for
monetary policy.  His argument follows that an
optimal currency area should be no larger than the
region over which labor is mobile, so that regional
recessions could be eased through labor moving to
where jobs are more plentiful.6  If this common
economic base does not exist, then either a mechanism
for fiscal transfers and/or labor mobility must exist.
Therefore, Mundell would probably be in favor of a
European Union consisting of 5 members over a
European Union of 15 nations, when the ins and
pre-ins are determined early next year.
Next year will be a time to establish a large
currency area, according to the view of Ronald
McKinnon.  McKinnon proposes that the EU is a more
stable currency area than any individual country, just
as the USA is a better currency area than New York.
If the economic base of the EMU is too small, the
purchasing power will fluctuate too much as the
Exchange Rate changes.  Fluctuations in the Exchange
Rate with other countries would place the price levels
of goods and services produced outside of the area or
country on a constant shifting state.  Fluctuations
would especially increase if there is a lot of trade
between two countries.  If two countries trade a lot, a
common currency may be optimal.7
These different theories bring several questions
to the forefront.  Once an EMU forms, will some of
the economic differences decrease or diminish,
regardless of its present size?  Likewise, with the 15
member nations joining, will a larger Union become
more optimal, according to McKinnons premise?
Additionally, one must consider the effects of a future
expansion of the EU, encompassing Eastern Europe
and its effect on the Economic and Monetary Union.
Historically, the EU has grown into its present
state from four previous enlargements in 1973(Ireland
and Denmark), 1981(Greece), 1986(Spain and
Portugal) and 1995(Austria, Sweden and Finland).
Additional enlargements from the former Eastern Bloc
countries will provide challenges for both the EU and
those countries anxiously applying.  One must examine
the individual situations of each country, since
economic levels and progress differ in this zone.
Additionally, both the EU and applicant country must
weigh the pros and cons of enlargement in the short
and long runs.  In this sense, an effective enlargement
should involve timetables with goals and deadlines in
order for it to be effective for all of Europe.
Ultimately, the issue is each countrys health, not its
wealth.8
An application process is handling the 10
Eastern European applications.  In 1994, both
Hungary and Poland submitted their applications to
the European Council.  Six nations addressed their
applications to the Council: Romania, Slovakia,
Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria in 1995.  The
Czech Republic and Slovenia applied in 1996.  The
European Council responds to these requests with a
published opinion.  This opinion includes a
description of economic and political conditions in
each applicant country, an evaluation of the countrys
ability to successfully adapt to the goals and
regulations of the EU, possible difficulties the nation
may have in the EU and a recommendation that
initiates a negotiating procedure.    These criteria also
require the stability of democracy, human rights, the
protection of minorities, etc.  Additionally, the country
must have a functioning market economy that can cope
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with the requirements and pace of the EU.
After studies are completed, negotiation
procedures follow. Article O of the Amsterdam Treaty
handles these issues of enlargement; the European
Council emphasizes that all applicants will be treated
separately and fairly. The length of the negotiations
will vary from country to country.  Given the variation
in the transition periods of the current EU nations, it is
difficult to make a general statement about how long
the future enlargements will take.  It took Spain over
a decade of negotiations and transitional periods to
finally join in 1986.  On the other hand, Austria,
Finland and Sweden received all of the rights of
membership from day one without passing through
a transitional period in1996.9
          Agreements were established with Poland, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and
Bulgaria.  The three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania) along with Slovenia are waiting for
their agreements to be ratified.   In the meantime, these
nations are preparing by strengthening both their short
experiences with democracy and capitalism.  The
recent resignation of the Czech Prime Minister Vaclav
Klaus is one example of the changing political climate
in Eastern Europe.  As a result of this political event,
the Czech koruna plunged, experiencing a significant
depreciation (requiring more Czech korunas to
purchase foreign goods).
The EUs financial support program for the
applicant members, or Phare, is providing assistance
for these nations to improve their infrastructures and
participate in Community programs.10   Enlargement
will signify an increase in the EUs budget, implying
short run costs for the present EU countries. The
Community Agricultural Policy and Structural Funds
will have to be reallocated, possibly drawing funds
away from nations like Greece, that as a member since
1981, should have priority to these funds.  This will
no doubt be a very sensitive time for those citizens
that do not have confidence in the EU in the first place.
These decisions and possible additions may increase
the EU from 370 million to 480 million citizens.11
Such a shift may have a huge impact on the internal
structure of EU organizations, including the number
of votes in the European Council, for example.
Such a large Union provides a large economic
base, ideal for McKinnons theory.  In light of the
present economic goals and challenges, will the EU
be ready to take on enlargement now, or in the near
future?  Perhaps, it is better to wait, at least after the
ins have established an EMU.  The pre-ins should
later join a small, established EMU when they have
proven that they can maintain the five previously
mentioned convergence criteria with relative ease.
Then, after the present 15 member nations have
established an EMU-15, the possible-ins (the
applicant Eastern European countries) should become
a priority of the EU.  Eventually, the EU may be able
to address the applications of Turkey, Cyprus and
Malta.  Political conditions and economic forces may
strengthen or weaken their cases for entry.
These goals will be achieved when the time is
right.  To turn back on a project that will soon be 40
years in the making would be foolish, as well as very
difficult to accomplish.  The EU must carry on as it
has, but with reasonable timetables, especially for the
young market economies of the applicant countries.
Certainly, if a rapid and financially sound EMU could
evolve in a short amount of time, all European nations
would benefit.  However, expectations must be
realistic.  The ins, pre-ins and possible-ins will
work simultaneously and independently to achieve
their goals.  Different challenges will influence each
nations progress.  By aiming for an EMU-6 of
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Italy, for example, these members
may proceed ahead in a small EMU, while the other
nations push ahead at their own pace.  As long as
deadlines are not pushed further and further back, the
EMU will grow eventually, accepting one or a few
new members at a time, so that both the EMU and
each individual country has time to adjust
harmoniously.  Like a class of students, each student
may be learning at a different level and have different
difficulties with certain subject material.  Similarly,
the economies of European nations are at different
stages aiming toward the formation of an Economic
and Monetary Union.  Nonetheless, countries, like
individuals in a classroom, should be allowed to
progress and be challenged in a way that they are
productive and working harmoniously with the rest
of the class.
The EU 6 or the EU 15+?
The Park Place Economist / vol. VI
ENDNOTES AND REFERENCES
1 Copeland, Lawrence. Exchange Rates and
International Finance, Second Edition,
Addison Wesley, 1994,  p. 281
2 Hubbard, R. Glenn.  Money, the Financial
System, and the Economy, Second Edition,
Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 1997,  p.
583.
3 Caves, Richard E.; Frankel, Jeffery A.; Jones,
Ronald W. Is Europe an Optimal Currency
Area? World Trade and Payments, Seventh
Edition, Harper Collins, 1996,  p. 604.
4 , Europes Single Currency The Economist,
11 October, 1997,  p. 21.
5 Hubbard p. 497.
6 Dunn, Robert M.; Ingram, James C.  Interna-
tional Finance and Open Economy Macro
economics, John Wiley & Sons, 1996,   p.
522.
7 Ibid  p. 522-523.
8 European Union Information WebPage, To
gether in Euope: Newsletter for Central
Europe no. 83, Online. Available at: <
http://europa.eu.int/newsletter/ >
9 Dunn, Robert M.; Ingram, James C.; p. 522-
523.
10 European Union Information WebPage,
Together in Europe: Newslettter for Central
Europe no. 83.
ALSO USED
DeDrauwe, Paul. The Economics of Monetary
Integration, Oxord University Press, 1994,  Ch. 2-4.
Hantak
